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I. Abstract 
 
The objective of this exploratory study is to develop a theorization of how political 
leadership could have an impact on domestic solar energy development. Theorization 
means in this case the identification of empirical ideal types of solar energy leadership 
as manifested in six dimensions of policy strategies and analyzed by theoretical, ideal-
typical modes of leadership. Based on previous research, three cases, the EU, USA 
and China, are selected and their policy strategies in terms of domestic solar energy 
development are analyzed in the following six operative dimensions: policies, research 
and development (R&D), institutionalization, international agreements, support for 
less-developed countries, and customs. For the analysis, leadership itself is 
decomposed in four scholarly modes of international political leadership, which will 
serve as the coding frame of the qualitative content analysis of material illustrating the 
policy strategies of the cases in the respective dimensions covering a period from 2009 
to early 2016. The analysis reveals three distinct approaches to solar energy 
development leading to the identification of three empirical ideal types and a 
suggestion how they might affect solar energy development. By opening room for 
discourse on employed practices, this exploratory and inductive study will not only set 
up a typology for empirical ideal-types of solar energy leadership, but also provide 
implications for political action for fostering development and positioning in the global 
comparison. Thereby, it is explored whether a specified leadership analysis could 
contribute to explain variations in domestic solar energy development. 
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1. Introduction  
The objective of this exploratory study is to develop a theorization of how political 
leadership could have an impact on domestic solar energy development. Theorization 
means in this case the identification of empirical ideal types of solar energy leadership 
as manifested in six dimensions of policy strategies and analyzed by theoretical, ideal-
typical modes of leadership.  
From the point of view of the mid 2010s, it might be difficult to imagine the 
European Union (EU) as a proper laggard in environmental matters, however, that was 
the starting point in the 1980s, when the USA were clearly frontrunner in 
environmental protection measures (Oberthür, 1999). Historically, there were major 
differences between the global major powers in which path they followed in 
environmental politics. Who was leading changed with succession and changes in 
governments that entailed developments in policies. According to previous research, 
the USA were a key actor and showed “determined leadership” (Wurzel & Connelly, 
2011, p.3) at the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone layer (1985) and 
during the establishment of the following Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) (Oberthür as cited in Kilian & Elgström, 2010). Back 
then, the EU’s climate policy was in its cradle and the Union posed itself as a laggard 
protecting its own industry (Wurzel & Connelly, 2011; Gupta & Grubb, 2000). Still in 
1992, the George H. W. Bush administration was among the first governments to ratify 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); however, 
during the Clinton-Gore era, climate protection and the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP) lacked the support of the Senate (Parker & Karlsson, 2010). When 
George W. Bush took into office in 2001, the USA abdicated its leadership role in the 
area of climate change and disengaged from international environmental governance, 
because the U.S. American discourse questioned the science behind and the 
seriousness of the posed threat (Harris, 2007; Parker & Karlsson, 2010, p.928; Bang 
& Schreurs, 2010, p.235; Karlsson et al., 2011, p.94). The “no regrets strategy” (Bang 
& Schreurs, 2010, p.235) was the dominant principle in the guiding norms of climate 
policy focusing the attention on the cost of climate action and, consequently, action 
was only taken if the result would be beneficial to the economy in the end, for instance 
by energy efficiency improvements (Bang & Schreurs, 2010).  
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When the USA turned its back on climate change leadership, the EU filled the 
vacuum that unfolded and it was the first major economic power in the world to begin 
seriously tackling climate change (Paterson, 2009; Parker & Karlsson, 2010, p.928). 
Wurzel and Connelly (2010) can identify four phases the EU has gone through: the 
formation and formulation phase from the 1980s to 1992, the KP negotiation until 
2001, the KP rescue phase lasting until 2005, and implementation of the KP and the 
follow-up agreement negotiations afterwards. Particularly, the first phase is of interest 
for the shift towards a climate change policy. Initially, the European Parliament (EP) 
favored the decision (1986) and the European Commission’s (EC) communication in 
1988 for the established United Nation’s (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) supported the idea. Third, in Dublin in 1990, the European Council 
expressed the “enormous capacity to provide leadership” (European Council, 1990, 
p.11) in global environmental politics. This acknowledgement by three of the major 
EU institutions was followed by the final proposal of the EC in 1991 and has to be 
seen in the context of the preparation for the UN Rio summit (Pallemaerts & Williams, 
2006; Wurzel & Connelly, 2010). Ever since, the officials of the EU have frequently 
confirmed the pursuit of environmental leadership in climate change matters and the 
actions followed these words over the years. The rescue of the KP, the establishment 
of the Directorate-General (DG) Climate Action, the 2020 Climate and Energy 
Package (2020 CEP), the introduction of the Emission Trading System (ETS) and the 
updated 2030 Climate and Energy Framework (2030 CEF) are striking steps on the 
EU’s ladder towards leading the international environmental governance. Thereby, 
environmental and energy policies have been central to the EU integration process by 
advancing the common stance towards climate change, fostering a common approach 
to renewable energies and strengthening the EU’s position on the global stage (cf. 
Oberthür & Kelly, 2008).  
When the Obama administration came into office, the USA started embracing 
the international scientific community’s warnings more diligently and, hence, 
employed a distinct approach to climate change mitigation (Bang & Schreurs, 2010, 
p.235). In particular, the engagement on the global stage can be seen as stepping 
forward with leadership aspirations again. Despite the necessity for the U.S. 
government to consult Congress and get its support in regard of international 
agreements, the Obama administration achieved to create the eventually signed 
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Copenhagen Accord at the Conference of Parties (COP) 15 in co-operation with The 
People’s Republic of China1 and the other BASIC countries2 (Bang & Schreurs, 2010). 
Since then, the USA have attempted to further their leadership ambitions and reinstate 
their leadership position. President Obama stated at the COP 21 that “the U.S.A. not 
only recognizes our role in creating this problem, we embrace our responsibility to do 
something about it” (Frizell, 2015) and, in an interview, he added, “America is now a 
global leader when it comes to taking serious action to fight climate change. Approving 
the project [the Keystone XL oil pipeline] would have undercut that global leadership” 
(Aguirre, 2015).  
During the COP 14 and at the COP 15, when the world looked to the USA and 
China to secure a resolution, it was one of the first times, China presented itself as 
willing to establish itself as a cooperating and leading partner in environmental 
protection (Karlsson et al., 2011). Although China positions itself as a developing 
country, it has been rewarded for its efforts in forging the Copenhagen Accord and 
supporting less-developed countries, in particular in Africa, with roughly the same 
recognition as a leader as the EU on the global stage (e.g. China, 2015; Karlsson et al., 
2012; Parker et al., 2012). Scholars agree that international environmental leadership 
“will depend not only on [EU’s] actions but also on other actors such as the US and 
major developing countries” (Oberthür & Kelly, 2008, p.48) (Kilian & Elgström, 
2010; Karlsson et al., 2011; Karlsson et al., 2012). This is confirmed by the look at the 
data from the International Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme 
(IEA PVPS) that verifies China’s leading role in terms of annually installed capacity 
in 2015 and total installed capacity of solar energy (IEA PVPS, 2016; Table 1 in the 
Appendix). 
This still does not give an answer to what exactly environmental leadership is or 
what makes for leaders. An international environmental leader would have to employ 
modes of leadership in regard of climate change mitigation, internationally shaping 
preferences by creating costs and benefits, leading by example, raising global 
consciousness aiming for joint solutions, and fighting for passing actual deals. Not 
only scholars agree on the importance of ambitious and effective leadership in complex 
international challenges such as tackling the potentially catastrophic consequences of 
                                                          
1 Henceforth, ‘China’.  
2 The BASIC countries include Brazil, South Africa, India and China. 
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climate change, but also political actors (Foley, 2014; Parker & Karlsson, 2010, p.923-
4). For instance, the Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull or UN’s Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon stated the significance of collective, respectively concerted 
leadership to secure the future (Grasinger, 2015; Ki-Moon, 2008). Scholars agree that 
leadership is an essential determinant of success and failure in addressing transnational 
challenges and forging global governance arrangements (Young, 1991; Sjöstedt, 1994; 
Underdal, 1994). The complexity of the issue, for instance because of the number of 
actors involved and the intricacy of the problem, and the global effects of global 
warming and climate change longs for joint action (Underdal, 1994; Karlsson et al., 
2011). As nearly all countries are involved in addressing the challenge,3 the need for 
global governance arrangements is obvious. Without leadership and a joint solution, 
efforts and even targets would not add up to the goal humankind should have according 
to scientist. Furthermore, the diverse state of development of countries strongly affects 
the capabilities, also in regard of hard and soft resources such as knowledge and 
technology. Diffusion and distribution can be guided and preferences shaped to raise 
measures to slow down and, eventually, reign in climate change.  
So far, no research on environmental leadership has taken in all aspects of it, 
analyzed the diverse connected fields and lived up to the complexity of its object of 
investigation. Most often, the focus of even latest research was on the EU alone or on 
international conferences like the COP 3 in Kyoto in 1997 or the COP 15 in 
Copenhagen and recognition of leaders (e.g. Kilian & Elgström, 2010; Parker & 
Karlsson, 2010; Karlsson et al., 2011; Karlsson et al., 2012; Parker et al., 2012). 
Consequently, by not acknowledging the intricacy of environmental leadership and 
actually failing to provide a clear definition of the matter, previous research has fallen 
short to provide a thorough overall analysis of the global competitors. Claiming 
environmental leadership cannot be assessed in its entirety by a non-extensive and 
small-scale research project or perhaps at all, the focus of this study will be on one 
sole aspect of environmental leadership, namely solar energy leadership. This study 
will contribute to the discourse by analyzing employed policy strategies and discarding 
the aspect of perception as sole object of investigation. Additionally, in a holistic 
approach, the analysis will encompass six dimensions of policy strategies that could 
                                                          
3 Over 150 parties handed in Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) prior to the COP 
21 in Paris, 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015). 
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have an impact on the domestic solar energy development. By expanding the spectrum 
of cases based on previous research (Kilian & Elgström, 2007; Karlsson et al., 2011, 
2012; Parker et al., 2012), it will analyze the approaches of all perceived leaders. 
There are two main arguments for the choice of solar energy. On the one hand, 
in times of global instability, especially due to tensions between Western countries and 
the Russian Federation in regard of the Ukraine crisis and the Syrian war, energy 
security and its impact on national sovereignty are of utmost significance, as threats 
and actual stops in gas distribution have shown (e.g. BBC, 2015a; Oberthür & Kelly, 
2008). Whereas fossil fuels entail and build up dependencies on supplier, price and 
supply, renewable energy sources (RES) have been one solution to decouple nation 
state’s energy supply and, thus, to strengthen national sovereignty, since other 
(political) actors cannot influence their natural occurrence. On the other hand, while 
major world powers and global conferences have acknowledged climate change to be 
a threat not only to biodiversity but also to humankind, the importance of RES has 
risen even further (e.g. China, 2015; China, 2014). National efforts to increase the 
proportion of RES in the energy supply and, thereby, foster carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emission mitigation have seen considerably more support during the last decade. First, 
hydropower is substantially dependent on natural preconditions such as the existence 
of rivers, streams and lakes and, hence, its employment is extremely limited. Second, 
wind energy is consuming large pieces of land and sea while simultaneously depending 
on wind strength – not talking about not-assessed long-term influences of wind parks 
on global wind cycles. Recent research confirms the universal potential of solar energy 
due to its abundancy and solar energy has been recognized in politics as a game 
changer in climate mitigation as well (e.g. China, 2015; China, 2014). Being a global 
phenomenon, the assessment of the employed policy strategies to facilitate the 
development of the solar energy sector in regards of energy supply is of significance.  
Transposing leadership now on solar energy, global leaders combine political 
actions to frame issues and challenges in the first place, find solutions and gain 
experience with them, promote the best practices demonstrating their feasibility and 
superiority, create incentives and shape preferences of other actors, step in to negotiate 
and pass deals for joint efforts sealed by international agreements. These leadership 
aspects, which can be defined as modes of leadership, will guide the analysis of the six 
dimensions of policy strategies for solar energy leadership including policies, research 
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and development (R&D), institutionalization, international agreements, support for 
less-developed countries including knowledge transfer and financial support, and 
customs.  
This will be conducted by an exploratory and inductive study analyzing the 
behavior of the European Union as compared to the USA and China from a leadership 
perspective. Starting with the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
of these three cases handed in prior to the COP 21 in Paris in 2015, material from 2009 
to 2016 will be analyzed by qualitative content analysis to illustrate, identify and label 
the employed policy strategies of solar energy leadership. Thereby and in addition, it 
will be explored how fruitful a specified leadership analysis could contribute to explain 
variations in domestic solar energy development. 
1.1. Outline of the Thesis 
In order to present a plausible and comprehensive argument, it is necessary to evaluate 
previous research first and the next chapter will revisit the latest and most relevant 
studies. Taking this as a starting point, this study will provide first an exhaustive 
argument of the relevance of leadership and second an operationalized definition of 
political leadership disassembling it into four ideal-typical modes according to major 
scholars in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will state the research question, the aim and relevance 
of this study as well as its contribution. Following, Chapter 5 will present the design 
of the study, in particular the operationalization of the dimensions of policy strategy 
in regard of solar energy leadership. Furthermore, this chapter will unfold an argument 
for the selection of cases, videlicet the European Union, the USA and China, the 
methodological approach, the material considered and the delimitations of the study. 
Chapter 6 will analyze each dimension of policy strategies employed by the three 
cases. The seventh chapter will discuss the results answering the research question and 
identifying which empirical ideal types of solar energy leadership materialized in the 
examination of the cases. The final chapter will conclude the whole research project.  
2. Previous Research 
Over the last decades, European studies has seen a rise of studies on the political 
aspects of climate change, which have considerably changed and gone through a 
diverse set of phases. When research laid its eye on climate change mitigation in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, the USA had already retreated from a frontrunner position 
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in environmental protection. Hence, nearly all studies focused on the EU that stepped 
into the void that emerged from the renunciation of the cross-Atlantic country 
(Oberthür, 1999; Gupta & Ringius, 2001; Vogler, 2005; Elgström, 2007; Groenleer & 
Van Schaik, 2007; Damro, Hardie & MacKenzie, 2008; Oberthür & Kelly, 2008; 
Kelemen, 2010; Parker & Karlsson, 2010). This Eurocentrism held for at least a decade 
and, still, the European perspective is at the heart of research.  
Right from the start, political climate change research identified leadership as 
a being crucial for the global development, mainly due to the complexity of issue in 
terms of the magnitude of involved actors and policy areas, so scholars utilized 
leadership theory to explain behavior on the world stage (Gupta & Ringius, 2001; 
Vogler, 2005; Oberthür & Kelly, 2008). Thereby, the modes of leadership introduced 
by Oran R. Young (1991), Arid Underdal (1994) and Raino Malnes (1995) were the 
most prominent, and research still uses them frequently to scrutinize actor behavior in 
climate change matters (Gupta & Ringius, 2001; Groenleer & Van Schaik, 2007; 
Elgström, 2007; Paterson, 2009; Kilian & Elgström, 2010; Parker & Karlsson, 2010; 
Parker et al. 2012).  
Within leadership research in the area of climate change, it is easy to discover 
strong foci. First, the focal point on global conferences and multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) is striking. Most scholars analyzed specific aspects such as 
interest realization, recognition, cohesion, autonomy and congruency, or actors 
themselves, mainly the EU, at one or two global conferences such as the COPs of the 
UNFCCC (Oberthür, 1999; Vogler, 2005; Elgström, 2007; Groenleer & Van Schaik, 
2007; Oberthür & Kelly, 2008; Paterson, 2009; Kelemen, 2010; Kilian & Elgström, 
2010; Karlsson et al. 2011; Karlsson et al. 2012; Parker et al., 2012). A substantial 
amount of these scholars identified perception to be key to leadership, as leadership 
contenders are in need of followers. In early perception studies, self-perception and 
the contrast to others’ was more important, especially in regard of the EU’s self-
proclaimed leadership resulting in analysis whether the EU can live up to its 
aspirations and ambitions (Vogler, 2005; Elgström, 2007; Council, 1990). While 
perception analysis have prevailed, deeds and performance of actors have not been 
considered as strongly or in single studies particularly in recent years, aside from a few 
exceptions (Vogler, 2005; Oberthür & Kelly, 2008; Paterson, 2009; Parker & 
Karlsson, 2010). 
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Over the years, there was a shift towards the followers’ perception of potential 
leaders that was called recognition (Kilian & Elgström, 2010; Karlsson et al. 2011; 
Karlsson et al. 2012; Parker et al., 2012). The new focus emphasized the demand side 
of leadership and, thus, analyzing followers, their interests, perception and relation to 
leadership contestants (Gupta & van der Grijp, 2000; Elgström, 2007; Kilian & 
Elgström, 2010; Karlsson et al. 2011; Karlsson et al. 2012; Parker et al., 2012). In 
particular, the study by Karlsson, Parker, Hjerpe and Linnér that resulted in several 
articles was vital for the advance of climate change and environmental leadership 
research. They were the first after Bertil Kilian and Ole Elgström (2010) to 
acknowledge the competitive aspect of leadership in their study. Not only the 
contender status of the USA as a potential leader alongside the EU was expressed, as 
did only a few earlier studies (e.g. Paterson, 2009), but also of China, as it has 
considerably gained recognition on the global stage (Karlsson et al. 2011; Karlsson et 
al. 2012; Parker et al., 2012). 
Despite the shifts, changes and developments in political climate change and 
environmental leadership research, there is a gap to be filled. By looking at followers 
and the demand side of leadership in this regard, scholars have partly overcome 
Eurocentrism issues. Thereby, they identified China next to the revitalized USA and 
weakened EU as candidates on the stage. However, neither has a study looked beyond 
the USA’s roles in MEAs nor scrutinized the efforts of China in terms of global 
environmental leadership and climate change mitigation. As scholars claim that the 
EU has lost some of its leadership momentum, all three of them have to be examined 
as equally important contestants on the leadership stage taking all dimensions of 
leadership into account. Perception or recognition analyses are not sufficient to 
confirm leadership in a field that so profoundly affects the world as does climate 
change. Even pledges are only words, and words are known to be wind. Consequently, 
deeds and performances including not only roles at global conferences and in 
international agreements, but also their domestic policies, R&D efforts, 
institutionalization, support for less developed countries and customs have to be 
analyzed. Being aware that it is not possible to do this in all climate change aspects in 
one study, since it would be beyond scope, this following study will narrow it down to 
one sole aspect of environmental leadership, namely solar energy leadership.  
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3. Theoretical Framework: Significance and Modes of International 
Political Leadership 
“Leaders matter; but political leaders matter more than most and for more reasons than 
most.” (Foley, 2013, p.1) This is the first sentence of Michael Foley’s book Political 
Leadership: Themes, Contexts, and Critique (2013). In the preamble, he unfolds his 
exhaustive argument on the manifold facets of political leadership. When looked upon 
any modern system, “it appears to be the case that there is practically no problem that 
cannot be attributed to an alleged failure of leadership, and no solution that cannot be 
achieved through an alternative leadership” (Foley, 2013, p.2). Functions of political 
leaders and expressions of political leadership have expanded their diversity and serve 
in a vast variety of ways; from breaking down structural complexity to bringing 
simplified order; from tipping the balance in decision-making processes to shaping 
policy agendas itself; from providing a sense of strategic directions to guaranteeing 
continuity in fast-paced times; from capturing and guiding public attention to serving 
as an overarching symbol and personification of an idea, a cause or policy; not least, 
evoking a sense of social solidarity and cultural identity by expressing shared values 
or national interests (Foley, 2013). In addition, leaders pave the way, experiment with 
approaches and share knowledge and best-practice solutions, especially in the face of 
common international challenges (Foley, 2013; Rhodes & t’ Hart, 2014).  
Furthermore, when the history of a great reform is the object of research, 
leadership is at its core, according to Rhodes and t’ Hart’s Oxford Handbook of 
Political Leadership (2014). Although there is no unified theory of leadership, but “too 
many definitions, and too many theories in too many disciplines” (Rhodes & t’ Hart, 
2014, p.16), and there is no agreement on what the essence of leadership is, how it 
should be studies or why, scholars concur that leaders or leadership are necessary but 
not sufficient criteria for change (Rhodes & t’ Hart, 2014). Among the variety of 
definitions, Nannerl O. Keohane’s (2010) quote of Schumpeter’s clarification of 
leaders seem to be fundamental stating, “[l]eaders determine or clarify goals for a 
group of individuals and bring together the energies of members of that group to 
accomplish those goals” (p.23). During the 20th century, leadership theories thrived 
and, as Rhodes and t’ Hart (2014) note adequately, “left us with a bewildering array of 
concepts, frameworks, propositions, stories, assessments, prescriptions, and clichés 
about leadership across many academic disciplines and professional domains” (p.3). 
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They identify the study of leadership as a complex and disjointed interdisciplinary 
enterprise and offer insight in political leadership from all perspectives (Rhodes & t’ 
Hart, 2014).  
Since the 1990s, typologies, forms and modes of political leadership have been 
introduced for the attempt of analyzing methods and styles leaders utilize within an 
increasingly international or globalizing context. Young (1991), Underdal (1994) and 
Malnes (1995) are the most quoted authors in this regard and are commonly used as a 
key point of departure in scholarly works (Parker & Karlsson, 2014). Identifying 
similarities and common features of the distinct terms of former authors, Parker and 
Karlsson (2014) conclude that there are not three modes, as previous research 
suggested, but four modes of leadership: structural, directional, idea-based and 
instrumental. First, structural or coercive leadership aims at shaping preferences and 
influencing behavior of other actors utilizing power and material resources to create 
incentives and coercion, costs and benefits, threats and promises (Young, 1991, p.288-
293; Underdal, 1994, p.186-7). Second, directional or unilateral leadership can be 
circumscribed as leading by example and demonstrating will employing frontrunner 
approaches or technology demonstrating feasibility, value and superiority of particular 
policy solutions (Malnes, 1995, p.92; Underdal, 1994, p.183-5). Third, idea-based or 
intellectual leadership uses framing and promotion of specific ideas of policy solutions 
to create joint solutions as well as raise consciousness over a long period of time 
(Young, 1991, p.298-302; Malnes, 1995, p.98-101). Finally and closely connected to 
the latter, instrumental, entrepreneurial or problem-solving leadership is based on 
negotiating skills to pass deals with participants who would otherwise try to avoid 
commitment; however, disparate from intellectual leadership, its approach focuses on 
the presence, the actual negotiation, and not on long-term solutions (Underdal, 1994, 
p.187-191; Young, 1991, p.293-298; Malnes 1995). The ideas of the intellectual 
leaders often serve as a foundation for the problem-solving leadership with the former 
leaders not being enabled to control what the negotiating instrumental leader will come 
up with (Young, 1991, p.300-1). Table 2 offers a synoptic view on the modes of 
leadership. 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Table 2: Modes of Leadership. 
Leadership Mode Aim Implementation 
Structural/coercive  To shape preferences and influence 
behavior of others 
 
Utilizing power resources creating 
incentives/benefits or coercion/costs 
 
Directional/unilateral  To lead by example, demonstrate 
will, show feasibility, value and 
superiority of solutions 
  
Employing frontrunner approaches 
and technology  
Idea-based/intellectual  To raise consciousness over a long 
period of time and create joint 
solutions 
 
Framing issues and promoting 
specific ideas of policy solutions  
Instrumental/entrepreneurial/ 
problem-solving 
To pass deals 
 
Employing negotiation skills 
 
4. Research Questions, Relevance and Contribution 
The objective of this exploratory study is to develop a theorization of how political 
leadership could have an impact on domestic solar energy development. Theorization 
means in this case the identification of empirical ideal types of solar energy leadership 
as manifested in six dimensions of policy strategies and analyzed by theoretical, ideal-
typical modes of leadership. These modes of leadership will serve as the deductive 
coding frame of the qualitative content analysis of the three cases, which have been 
identified as potential leaders by previous research, the European Union, the USA and 
the People’s Republic of China. Supposing the employment of specific strategies 
regarding the dimensions in regard of solar energy development, the efforts of the 
cases will represent mixes of leadership modes. Hence, it will be possible to identify 
empirical ideal types of solar energy leadership by an inductive approach. Thereby, it 
will be explored how fruitful a specified leadership analysis could contribute to explain 
variations in domestic solar energy development. The Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) prior to the COP 21 in Paris in 2015 will serve as a starting 
point providing insight into which further material should be assessed to illustrate the 
employed strategies, covering material from 2009 to 2016 that either affected and still 
shapes or reviews policies shaping solar energy development. 
Solar energy leadership has to be seen in the context of environmental 
leadership, since the apparent aim of the development and increase of solar energy is 
to foster CO2 emission mitigation and, hence, support efforts to address climate 
change. Thereby, this study seeks to contribute primarily to European studies and 
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environmental leadership research, as the European Union has been in the focus of this 
specific research area for decades and proclaims its leadership in the respective area.4 
In addition, environmental policies have been one driver of the European integration 
process resulting in a substantial amount of EU legislation. Repeatedly, the EU’s 
efforts have been critically examined and previous research has confirmed that its 
leadership momentum has faded (e.g. Kilian & Elgström, 2010; Karlsson et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, the EU has not given up its aspirations and still wants to live up to its 
ambitions, while contenders have emerged expanding the field of potential leaders. 
This leads to a comparative analysis of employed approaches, perspectives and 
solutions of three cases and opens space for discussing best-practice solutions and 
approaches, their feasibility and impact by assessing implemented political measures. 
Thereby, this study will attempt to fill the gap that has emerged from the sole focus on 
the self-perception and recognition of potential leaders, the analysis of global 
conferences or the European Union’s leadership aspirations by previous research. This 
study will contribute to political environmental studies by considering employed 
policy strategies and discarding the aspect of perception as sole object of investigation. 
Additionally, in a holistic approach, the analysis will encompass six dimensions of 
policy strategies that could have an impact on the domestic solar energy development. 
By expanding the spectrum of cases based on former studies by Kilian and Elgström 
(2007), Karlsson et al. (2011; 2012) and Parker et al. (2012) and including all 
perceived leaders, namely the USA and China, instead of only assessing the EU, this 
study will furthermore open room for discourse on policy strategies and how to lead 
in addressing solar energy development. Thus, this exploratory and inductive study 
will not only set up a typology for empirical ideal-types of solar energy leadership and 
attempt to theorize how leadership could have an impact on solar energy development, 
but also provide implications for political actors to choose measures, modes of 
leadership and policy strategies to position themselves internationally in the context of 
solar energy. Furthermore, it will serve as an illustration of a tool for the development 
of a typology of political actors in solar energy leadership, which might be transposed 
onto other areas. 
 
 
                                                          
4 See Chapter 2 Previous Research. 
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5. Design 
This chapter will elaborate on the methodological design. First, it will present the 
operative dimensions of policy strategies and their relevance for solar energy 
leadership. Subsequently, an argument will be unfolded for the case selection. 
Thereafter, the methodological approach, the empirical material and delimitations will 
be presented.  
5.1. Operative Dimensions of Policy Strategies 
As the objective of this exploratory study is to develop a theorization for how 
environmental leadership could have an impact on domestic solar energy development, 
it is necessary to decompose leadership into different dimensions of policy strategies, 
which affect the development of the domestic solar energy sector. The following 
dimensions have been deployed: Policies, R&D, institutionalization, international 
agreements, support for less-developed countries and customs. The following 
subchapters will unfold arguments for the dimensions providing statements on the 
significance of each in regard of domestic solar energy and their connection to 
leadership.  
5.1.1. Policies 
First, policies are the obvious way to have an impact on domestic solar energy 
development. Their implementation is the basis of all changes and shapes the progress 
within the national context. In terms of solar energy, promotional strategies are of 
importance, from subsidies and exclusive feed-in tariffs to the lowering of procedural 
requirements e.g. for building permits of solar photovoltaic (SPV) installations and 
solar energy plants.  
Policies introduced and enforced by law are sticks and carrots for actors within 
the field and, thereby, are based on the argument of structural or coercive leadership. 
Despite being domestically implemented, experimenting with policy solutions and 
demonstrating their feasibility or superiority are key features of directional leadership. 
By framing and shaping the perception, intellectual leadership can be a characteristic 
of policies as well. 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
5.1.2. Research and Development 
It is not far-fetched that there is a suggested connection of a knowledge-intensive field 
such as energy to its dependence on technology. Without the technology behind, there 
is neither production and deployment of energy nor any development or progress. 
Hence, it is necessary to compile a technological dimension for the analysis of solar 
energy leadership and, in particular, include research and development (R&D) efforts, 
since it contributes to the advance of knowledge and technology. Measures aiming at 
the collection of knowledge and furthering of technological progress of solar energy 
have to be considered starting with the basic subsidies or funding of research. In this, 
central and national funds might come together with regional, municipal and local 
support. Standardization, knowledge transfer and sharing efforts are also of 
significance and shall not be neglected.  
Albeit it is not the main idea of R&D efforts, structural leadership supports the 
advance by offering benefits, for instance in form of research grants. However, at the 
core of technological leaders is frontrunner and leading-by-example mentality, 
experimenting with different approaches and sharing, framing and promoting best-
practice solutions. Thus, it substantially relies on directional and idea-based 
leadership.  
5.1.3. Institutionalization 
Without a framework, the best policies and R&D efforts go to waste. Institutions are 
necessary to monitor, supervise, control, and, in case, be able to sanction or fine actors 
in the field. Therefore, the creation of public awareness of environmental issues and 
the institutionalization of the environment itself can be utilized to build a functioning 
management system. Solar energy regimes supervising all activity can be set up in 
disparate ways and endowed with various forms of authority. May the framework be 
set up formal by state institutions or complemented with non-institutional actors such 
as environmental non-governmental organizations (eNGOs) and economic actors 
controlling each other, the forms of a managing system can be across a wide spectrum, 
and empowered and integrated in different ways.  
As institutionalization is usually a long-term process, intellectual leadership with 
consciousness and values is at the core. The implementation of the ideas can 
nonetheless vary and lead to directional leadership in terms of leading by example by 
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employing exemplary or frontrunner structures of supervision. Manifestations of 
instrumental leadership could take various perspectives into account to find agreement.  
5.1.4. International Agreements 
Identifying the need of assessment, most of all former research in the field has focused 
on global conferences acknowledging their significance. The COP 3 in Kyoto in 1997 
and COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, which evolved from the UNFCCC, were 
significant events in the development of climate change awareness and the fight 
against the effects of global warming resulting in global agreements and national 
promises and contributions. Not neglecting the importance of global conferences, 
multilateral (trade) agreements and bilateral co-operations are likewise important for 
the assessment of solar energy leadership. For instance, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was argued to be the “greenest” trade agreement that has 
been signed so far (Mol, 2001, p.125), and deals concluded by EU MS with other 
countries – for instance between Germany and India – have impact on solar energy 
development (Tagesschau, 2015). Leadership is not only fact-based, but also depends 
on international participation, initiatives and recognition. The study by Kilian and 
Elgström (2010) is not only confirming this view that perception is essential for leaders 
but also pointing out that it might be time for bilateral alliance building (p.268). 
Despite referring to an international framework, agreements with other countries can 
have major impacts on domestic developments, in particular when it comes to global 
climate conferences leading to commitment to global protocols or bilateral agreements 
for instance resulting in co-operation on the matter.  
Considering international agreements in terms of leadership, idea-based or 
intellectual leadership is the underlying theme by raising consciousness and promoting 
solutions. Nevertheless, rather instrumental leadership is daily fare, as the process is 
explicitly fast and characterized by negotiations (Young, 1991, p.298). Directional 
leadership can exert influence as well but remains in the background as does structural 
leadership, which could also play a role in form of benefits in terms of side payments 
and promises in agreements with only a few actors.  
5.1.5. Support for Less-Developed Countries 
In spite of the fact that support for less-developed countries is again on first sight not 
domestically relevant, there are features significant for domestic development. 
Similarly to international agreements, efforts of support not only strengthen the 
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international position by acting as a solidary leader sharing knowledge and providing 
financial aid, but also have effects on domestic industries. As all are facing the same 
challenge together, cutting-edge technology and knowledge has to spread quickly to 
have the best impact in fighting for the common goal. Thereby, the domestic solar 
sector can be put forward to co-operate with foreign projects making them both thrive. 
As a result, the domestic industry would be fostered and the international position 
strengthened.  
Encouraging co-operation and providing direct financial support rely on the 
creation of incentives, thus, structural leadership. In addition, solidarity towards less-
developed countries is always connected to sharing and spreading ideas and values as 
well as policy solutions and, therefore, are manifestations of intellectual leadership and 
in some cases directional leadership. If negotiations are involved, instrumental 
leadership might be influential as well. 
5.1.6. Customs 
In contrast to the chapters on international agreements and support for less-developed 
countries that considerably connected to outflows of values and resources, customs 
deal with influx in terms of products and how it is managed. Rooted in sovereignty 
concerns and the maintenance of domestic power and industry, protectionist efforts 
such as tariffs on SPV and related products or non-tariff barriers are still in place.  
Protectionism works explicitly against the efforts of achieving a common goal 
and is not a sign for leadership on the global stage, but rather for lagging behind, 
despite being based on the sticks or threats of structural power. It undermines the 
system of sharing, spreading and pervading on the global stage. However, custom 
policies can be utilized as structural leadership efforts to foster the development of the 
domestic industry.  
5.2. Selection of Cases 
In terms of solar energy, there is a small set of frontrunners on display on the world 
stage, despite the acknowledgement of the potential of solar energy. For picking cases, 
the consideration of major economic powers is of importance as they are able to act as 
global leaders and be recognized for their efforts, since they can make a change. This 
view is confirmed by recent studies by Karlsson and Parker’s research team identifying 
the leadership recognition of the cases as the highest and at roughly the same level 
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(Karlsson et al. 2011; Karlsson et al. 2012; Parker et al., 2012). This chapter will also 
identify polity aspects that will have an impact on the analysis. 
5.2.1. The European Union 
Repeatedly, the EU has proclaimed its environmental leadership (e.g. European 
Council, 2007; EC, 2015a), and its aspiration to be “a global standard bearer on climate 
change” (Parker & Karlsson, 2010, p.924). Referring and according to previous 
research on environmental leadership,5 this claim has to be tested whether it can be 
uphold in the respect of solar energy, which is a significant contributor to climate 
mitigation. Acknowledging the Union’s institutional structure encompassing 28 
member states (MS) with distinct energy policy paths, the EU is a collective actor 
facing internal diversity.6 Energy and environment have been integrated into the shared 
competences between the Union and its MS in the Lisbon Treaty (EU, 2012, TFEU7 
Art.4; TFEU Art. 2(2)), but have to respect the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and 
proportionality (European Union, 2010, TEU8 Art.5). Having ceased the right to adopt 
legislation resulting for instance in Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of energy 
from renewable sources, the 2020 CEP and 2030 CEF, the Union is of relevance (EP 
& the Council, 2009), while directives have to be in translated into national law 
highlighting the role of MS (TFEU Art.288). Single MS can also account for 
substantial installations of solar energy capacity, for instance Germany was the 
frontrunner in installed capacity up to last year (IEA PVPS, 2016; Table 1 in the 
Appendix). 
5.2.2. The United States of America 
Despite the disengagement from international environmental governance and the 
abdication of its leadership role under the George W. Bush administration in the area 
of climate change (Parker & Karlsson, 2010), the USA is recognized as an economic 
leader and exerts influence internationally with its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
amounting to $17.4 trillion (World Bank, 2015). In addition, the USA was leading in 
environmental matters during the 1980s and, under the Obama presidency, the USA 
                                                          
5 Compare Chapter 2 Previous Research. 
6 For instance, Latvia and Estonia do not employ any promotional policies for solar energy (Pablo-
Romero, 2013). On the other hand, Germany and Italy alone account together for more than 45 GW of 
solar energy capacity and the former was the leader in installed capacity in 2014 (IEA PVPS, 2016; 
Table 1 in the Appendix). 
7 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.  
8 Treaty of the European Union. 
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caught up with the EU’s leadership recognition on the global stage by 2010 despite its 
reliance on oil (Karlsson et al., 2012; EIA9, 2016; Bang & Schreurs, 2010). At the COP 
21 in Paris, Obama stated that the agreement would contribute to American leadership 
and that the United States had transformed into the global leader in fighting climate 
change over the last seven years (Reuters, 2015b). Furthermore, in terms of installed 
capacity, the USA can account for more than 25 GW and places third in the last year’s 
annual installation (IEA PVPS, 2016; Table 1 in the Appendix). Therefore, the 
examination of the USA and its federal states as they have the competence to introduce 
bills, as long as their legislation does not infringe on any constitutional rights (U.S. 
Const.10 art. VI, §2; Daunt, 2014), will contribute to the assessment of the solar energy 
leadership.  
5.2.3. The People’s Republic of China 
While ten Chinese cities had to raise red smog alarm last year (BBC, 2015b), and 
despite its weak environmental protection standards, China’s economy is of 
international importance with a GDP of about $ 10.4 trillion, carrying implications for 
the world economy (World Bank 2015). In addition, over the last years, China has 
taken considerable action to expand its solar energy sector. In 2014, it became world 
leader in yearly installed solar capacity as well as in total installed capacity of solar 
energy only considering single nation states (China, 2014; Chu, 2015; IEA PVPS, 
2016; Table 1 in the Appendix). Confirmed by previous research, the global 
recognition of China as a potential leader in the fight against climate change has 
considerably risen and has definitively caught up with the EU some years ago 
(Karlsson et al., 2011; Karlsson et al. 2012; Parker et al., 2012). Hence, the 
investigation of China can further the debate of solar energy leadership by widening 
the perspective and expanding the traditional foci on Western cases, as it has never 
been assessed before as leader in climate mitigation. China also is set apart from the 
first two cases in its organizational structure. Although its provinces have the 
competence to flesh out national action plans, China remains a single nation-state 
marked by democratic centralism with a strong centralized and hierarchical internal 
structure (China, 2014; C. Wang, 2013). 
                                                          
9 U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
10 U.S. Constitution. 
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5.3. Empirical Material 
This research project will encompass the analysis of a wide range of material to cover 
the dimensions of policy strategies. In total, eight specific policy and program 
documents particularly shaping solar energy policy and the development of the sector 
were examined. In addition, five declarations and the Lisbon Treaty of the European 
Union have been included as well as the INDCs of the cases, which has been the 
starting point for the identification of material by shedding light on efforts of the cases 
to address climate change, including solar energy development. The relevant policies 
could be identified by the assistance of the INDCs and, to complement this 
information, sixteen official homepages of ministries and other institutional bodies 
have been taken into consideration stating the diverse efforts of the cases. 
Nevertheless, it has to be stated that official documents could not be identified for the 
analysis of all dimensions in the three cases. Due to the absence of material published 
by institutional sources, twenty publications on the policy strategies including one 
book, eight studies by researchers and non-governmental organizations, two websites 
and nine newspaper articles have been identified and analyzed to comprehensively 
illustrate the policy strategies of the cases. Overall, the material covers the timeframe 
2009 to early 2016.  
Ideally, only official statements of the efforts of the cases regarding the 
dimensions published by the institutional bodies would be considered to provide a 
higher consistency. However, they are not existent for all dimensions. Furthermore, 
the project would ideally take all policies of EU MS, U.S. states and Chinese provinces 
into consideration. Due to time, scope, and resource limitations, this is not feasible for 
this research project. Therefore, studies, reports and reviews on the policies on these 
subordinated levels are included to complement the analysis of the overall strategies. 
Due to the issue of availability and the mentioned limitations, the analysis of the 
material only serves as illustration of the employed strategies of the cases and does not 
claim to provide completeness. 
5.4. Methodological Approach 
This research project is set up in two parts. First, by employing qualitative content 
analysis, Chapter 6 will illustrate the policy strategies of the three cases, that is how 
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they have approached solar energy development utilizing established leadership 
modes. Second, discussing the findings, the objective of Chapter 7 is to develop a 
theorization identifying empirical ideal-types of solar energy leadership, based on Uta 
Gerhardt’s development of ideal types that was inspired by Max Weber’s work (Kluge, 
2013). Thereby, the overall analysis utilizes partly directed (part 1) and conventional 
(part 2) content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). 
In the first step (Chapter 6), the modes of leadership as laid out in Chapter 2 will 
deductively guide the exploratory and directed content analysis of the operative 
dimensions of policy strategies as predetermined codes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; 
Schreier, 2012). As single actions can represent several modes at the same time, the 
codes are part of a multi-dimensional typology not classification, since they are not 
mutually exclusive (Kluge, 2013; Hempel & Oppenheim, 1936). The successive 
analysis of the material will provide insight in how the three cases approach each 
dimension of policy strategies and solar energy development employing distinct and 
representative measures of modes of leadership. The guiding questions were the 
following: What measures are employed to influence solar energy development? 
Which mode of leadership do they represent? 
The second part (Chapter 7) will discuss the findings inductively identifying the 
empirical ideal types of solar leadership following conventional content analysis 
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). As no theory exists on solar energy leadership, conventional 
content analysis can be utilized to derive empirical ideal types (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005). The identified ideal types are part of a typology as well, since they do not aim 
at being exhaustive. 
5.5. Delimitations 
All research is endangered by the threat of being invalid, infeasible or not being 
capable to live up to criteria such as fullness. As all studies, this research project will 
have several limitations. First, it is necessary to point out that this research will focus 
on the operative dimensions for the assessment of actions in the field of solar energy 
and, in the end, the development of a theorization how political environmental 
leadership could have an impact on domestic solar energy development. Thereby, it 
will not consider other variables, such as the financial crisis and the development of 
the world economy despite their impact on capital and resource intensive fields and 
industries like energy, or the catastrophe of Fukushima leading to major changes in 
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energy strategies around the world. Nevertheless, the dimensions are subject to the 
criterion of fullness. That means that they are meant to cover all aspects of direct 
measures and influences of the cases. Furthermore, interrelatedness between the 
dimensions of policy strategies can be identified, however, the interplay will not be 
considered in this analysis. 
Qualitative research has to face the challenge of identifying important material. 
This may come to be a more problematic issue, as the material, in particular from 
China, might be hard to identify, access and assess facing a language barrier as a 
hindrance. As thesis in English and my set of languages limited to European languages, 
there was need for support and translation for the identification of material and the 
translation of Chinese documents to address this issue. Still, also due to transparency 
and structural issues, it is hard to identify, get access to and assess material from China. 
Consequently, mistakes and misunderstandings can occur due to the language barrier 
on both sides and may lead to wrong wordings. China itself puts forward that even the 
English versions of official documents are unofficial and only used as reference and 
does not represent the official statement (e.g. China, 2015). 
In addition, the fact that the institutional bodies under investigation are of 
considerable size, the amount of material for the analysis has to be limited and, thus, 
only aims at illustrating the employed strategies of the cases due to the appropriate 
scope of this research project. In particular, it was not possible to assess every EU MS, 
US state and China’s province policies in the process. Studies, reports, reviews and 
articles were used to complement the information that could be gathered by analyzing 
official documents and homepages of institutional bodies.  
6. Analysis 
This chapter will successively assess the operative dimensions of policy strategies 
revisiting the cases in sequence. 
6.1. Policies 
Various policy areas may touch upon domestic solar energy development, such as 
energy and natural resources, climate action and environment(al protection) as well as 
regional and local development leading to a complex structure characterized by 
amendments, complementation and interrelatedness.  
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6.1.1. EU 
The 2020 CEP and 2030 CEF are the most crucial adopted acts leading to further 
environmental legislation (Latvia & EC, 2015). As part of the Europe 2020 Strategy, 
the 2020 CEP, which was set up in 2007 and enacted in 2009, introduced three key 
targets for addressing climate change, among those to rise the proportion of energy 
from RES to 20% in the final gross consumption (EC, 2010b). Incorporating the vision 
of a larger proportion of RES and the highly ambitious goal, the 2020 CEP is a measure 
of idea-based and directional leadership by framing, raising consciousness and leading 
by example. The successor, the 2030 CEF, rendered the concrete and fixed targets for 
the MS of the 2020 CEP to more flexible, self-determined and non-binding 
commitments (EC, 2014). Thus, it can only been interpreted as an intellectual 
leadership effort, disengaging from the directional leadership aspect.  
One policy mechanism introduced with the first package and planned to be 
reviewed with the second is the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) (EC, 2010b; EC, 
2014; DG Climate, 2016c). Being the first of its kind and a frontrunner approach, the 
EU ETS is clearly a manifestation of directional leadership (DG Climate, 2016c). In 
addition, by putting a price on C02 emissions, costs are imposed on emitters. Thus, the 
ETS represents a structural leadership measure for the domestic industries.  
The second most prominent legislation established under the 2020 CEP was the 
so called Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC)11, which introduced the overall 
target of the 2020 CEP “to achieve a 20% share of energy from renewable sources in 
the Community’s gross final consumption of energy” (EP & Council, 2009, L 140/26 
(96)) and a share of 10% of renewables in the transport sector as well. Promoting the 
idea of a low-carbon society and, at the same time, strengthening RES represents the 
employment of frontrunner approaches and the vision of a solution. Forcing the MS 
and the industries and economies to conform to it by the threat of fines is a coercive 
measure. Setting fixed and binding targets can, thus, be understood as an effort 
characterized by intellectual, directional and structural leadership. 
As directives has to be transposed (EU, 2012: TFEU Art.288), the distinct policy 
strategies employed by the MS have to be considered as well. María del P. Pablo-
Romero (2013) exposes in her study on the status of solar energy policies in the EU 
the specific policy mechanisms MS introduced to raise the proportion of energy from 
                                                          
11 The 2009/28/EC Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. 
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SPV in relation to the 2020 objectives. She identifies that overall 25 of the EU27 MS 
introduced policies to promote SPV; eighteen of those MS employed feed-in tariffs 
(FITs) and feed-in premiums (FIPs), fifteen subsidies, four net metering, twelve tax 
incentives12, five trading schemes with green certificates, and five soft loans (Pablo-
Romero, 2013). All policies are manifestations of structural leadership in the first 
place, because they create incentives and benefits for the RES industry. Additionally, 
some measures, in particular net metering and the green certificate trading, could also 
be seen as directional leadership, as they are frontrunner approaches to promote RES 
(Pablo-Romero, 2013).  
By experimenting with variety of policy solutions, introducing ambitious targets 
demonstrating will and, in particular, the early introduction of the ETS, the EU has 
implemented the modes of directional and intellectual leadership. However, with the 
establishment of the 2030 CEF and its more flexible and non-binding commitments, 
the EU has considerably decreased the level of the efforts. Nevertheless, the ETS and 
the transposing promotional policies of the MS on the promotion serve as mechanisms 
of structural leadership to contribute to the development of solar energy by creating 
benefits and cost. Still, on national level, uniform leadership movement cannot be 
identified, also confirmed by Eurostat data (2014; 2015). Not all of the MS employ 
structural leadership measures nor can they account for directional or idea-based 
efforts.13  
6.1.2. USA 
As pointed out, the federal structure of the USA shapes the policies on solar energy. 
In fact, there are incentives available throughout the USA at the utility, county, state 
and federal level, which can take various shapes including tax credits, solar rebates, 
premium FITs and net metering, or solar production incentives (SEIA, 2016). 
According to Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) (2016) and the Database of 
State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE) (2015a), the most important 
policies are renewable portfolio standard policies (RPSPs), which have been 
introduced by 29 states so far and which profoundly vary from state to state. Setting 
up requirements for “utility companies to source a certain amount of energy they 
                                                          
12 Including tax deductions and tax credits, exemptions and reduced tax rates. 
13 In 2014, eight of the 27 MS (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Romania, Finland 
and Sweden) had reached their targets already, whereas six countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Romania, Finland and Sweden) were at least 5% below (Eurostat, 2014). 
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generate or sell from renewable sources such as wind and solar” (SEIA, 2016), RPSPs 
represent implementation of structural leadership exerting coercion towards the 
utilities. In addition, the standards employ directional and intellectual leadership to 
some extent, since they frame the issue and establish incremental targets for raising 
the proportion of energy from RES gradually over a certain amount of year to 10% to 
40% in that state (DSIRE, 2015a; SEIA, 2016). According to the North Carolina Clean 
Energy Technology Center (NCCETC) in 2014, eighteen states have established 
RPSPs that include more specific requirements (carve-outs) to promote particularly 
solar energy technologies, and, thus, strengthen their efforts in directional leadership 
(NCCETC, 2014). DSIRE can identify 23 states with such provision, the most 
ambitious among those being the RPSP of Arizona aiming for 4.5% by 2025 (DSIRE, 
2015b).  
The second most significant policies in U.S. states are Solar Power Purchase 
Agreements (SPPAs), which offer customers the opportunity to host SPV on their 
roofs providing them with solar energy without upfront cost. Most often, net metering 
by utility services accompanies SPPAs. According to the policy review conducted by 
the NCCETEC and the Meister Consultant Group (2016), there were proposals, 
enactments or studies of solar policy changes in at least 46 states in the field of net 
metering, valuation of distributed solar, fixed or solar charges, third-party or utility-
led rooftop ownership an community solar. As SPPAs and net metering should be 
considered more often in the European context being (Pablo-Romero, 2013), since the 
experimenting with them can be understood as frontrunner strategies leading to an 
interpretation as directional leadership. In addition, SPPAs create incentives for new 
installations and, thus, are examples of structural leadership. 
Another structural leadership measure is California’s tax exclusion policy for 
new SPV installations, which is the most significant state measure creating strong 
incentives (California State Senate, 2014; SEIA, 2016). However, this policy strategy 
has only been applied in California, while other states, such as Florida and Georgia 
have been considerably inactive in promoting new SPV installations (SEIA, 2016).   
On federal level, the Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy 
(OEERE) (2016a) as part of the Department of Energy (DOE) states President 
Obama’s Climate Action Plan and deployment commitments as the most crucial policy 
strategies. In these, the USA committed itself to advance the deployment by 885 MW 
 
25 
 
from 2014 onwards, at an estimated gross deployment of 15.9 GW in the first quarter 
of 2014 (OEERE, 2016a). Setting targets, the policy demonstrated will and, therefore, 
can be considered as directional leadership measure. Another political action was set 
up in December 2015, when Congress renewed the solar tax credits of thirty percent 
for new installations until the end of this decade (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 
2015). As tax credits create incentives and shape preferences, they are mechanisms of 
structural leadership.  
In conclusion, in spite of commitments and the tax credits, the overall U.S. policy 
strategies in solar energy development cannot be seen as considerably strong in either 
mode of leadership. Structural and directional leadership can be identified to some 
extent, however, even stronger on the state than on the federal level. The multitude of 
RPSPs and SPPAs were introduced as directional and structural measures, still not 
being considerably ambitious. In particular, California’s single and unmatched policy 
of tax exclusion is the most substantial structural leadership effort.  
6.1.3. China 
China’s policy strategy on solar energy development is set up in the National Program 
on Climate Action (NPCA) (2014-2020). Despite the fact, the only specifics in regard 
of solar energy that were introduced in the NPCA are the goal of 100 million KW, 
respectively 100 GW by 2020 and the “construction of a number of large-scale 
photovoltaic power plants” (China, 2014, p.8). Concerning existing legislation, it is 
pointed out in the NPCA that the relevant laws and regulations are weak and the 
institutional mechanisms, policies, systems and standards are not perfect (China, 
2014).14 The program identifies the need for improvement and maintenance of climate 
change related legislation in all respective fields, among others renewable energy 
(China, 2014). For this, an overall policy framework has to be established (China, 
2014), that was still lacking for renewables or specifically solar energy (Yan, 2011). 
Although the NPCA remains vague and shallow on concrete measures (China, 2014), 
it demonstrates will setting a target, frames the importance of solar energy and 
highlights necessary institutional change, therefore, is marked by directional and 
intellectual leadership. 
                                                          
14 Studies by Ying (2011) and Yan (2011) as well as a review of Forbes (Trefis Team, 2015) confirm 
this view.  
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The same mix of leadership is also the characteristic of China’s 12th Five-Year 
Plan (2011-2015) introducing the aim of 11.4% of its primary energy coming from 
renewable sources by 2015 and 15% by 2020. Establishing a renewable energy quota 
system setting targets between 2% and 10% excluding hydropower for each province, 
to which they will have to conform to, additionally represents structural leadership by 
exerting coercion (Chu, 2015). 
Already in 2005, China introduced the Renewable Energy Law (amended 2009) 
that was a first step and set up a framework for the promotion, support and funding for 
renewable resource technologies including solar from research to utilization 
(MOFCOM15, 2013). With the amendment in 2009, China introduced two separate 
policies to promote SPV installations, namely the Building-integrated photovoltaics 
(BIPV) subsidy program and the Golden Sun program16 (Jones, 2011a). The former 
supports small-scale rooftop and BIPV systems, whereas the latter aims at larger 
installations, technological support and market incentives to accelerate the 
industrialization of solar energy (Jones, 2011a). By financial incentives covering up to 
70% of the investment (Jones, 2011a), the programs are manifestations of structural 
leadership. Another structural leadership measure was the introduction of the 
renewable energy feed-in tariffs in 2012/13 that supported commercial or industrial 
enterprises to generate solar energy for self-consumption (Chu, 2015; Jones, 2011a). 
In addition to these subsidy policies, China employed preferential loan and land 
policies for solar companies. Lin Jones (2011b) identifies loans for three companies17 
amounting to more than RMB 300 billion that are more than €40 billion, and, probably, 
that are not the only subsidies. The same companies were additionally provided with 
large parcels of land at prices below market level to lower their production costs 
(Jones, 2011b). As the programs, these measures represent structural leadership 
creating benefits for the industry. 
In addition, and as the promotional policies are capped for each province,18 eight 
eastern provinces19 have introduced local SPV subsidies as promotional policies to 
increase the overall subsidies to solar power projects by 20-50% (Azure International 
                                                          
15 China’s Ministry of Commerce. 
16 The Golden Sun program accounts for RMB 20 billion, that is nearly €2.7 billion (U. Wang, 2009). 
17 Yingli Solar, Suntech and Trina Solar (Jones, 2011a). 
18 The Golden Sun Program establishes a cap of 20 MW for each province including installations 
fostered by the BIPV program (Jones, 2011c). 
19 Namely Hebei, Henan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai and Shanxi. 
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in Chu, 2015; Jones, 2011c). More than half of China’s provinces have further 
established commercial and industrial time of use pricing policies for solar energy in 
addition to a diverse repertoire of promotional strategies (Azure International in Chu, 
2015; Jones, 2011c). All measures aim at creating incentives and are structural 
leadership measures in the end. 
Summarizing employed policies on solar energy, China utilizes in particular 
manifestations of structural leadership, such as subsidies, provisions and loans, to 
foster advance of its domestic solar energy on national and provincial level. 
Furthermore, the material, especially the NPCA and the 12th Five-Year Plan, clearly 
shows will and the utilization of framing, thus, directional and intellectual leadership. 
This is especially evident in the INDC in which China states its plan to introduce an 
ETS (China, 2015).  
6.2. Research and Development 
The knowledge- and technology-intensity of solar energy seems apparent. Therefore, 
the question is how the cases foster technological advance, especially considering the 
fact that solar energy technology has not been advanced to its full potential due to 
storage limitations, energy losses in the translation process and in the very production 
process. The diverse layers of support due to organizational structures have to be taken 
into consideration. 
6.2.1. EU 
Integrated into the Europe 2020 Strategy, specifically in the Horizon 2020, the EU 
introduced the aim to become the global leader in renewable energy (DG R&I, 2016a). 
To achieve this, the EC has set up a target for investment in research and development, 
namely that the funding of R&D should amount to 3% of the EU’s GDP (DG Energy, 
2016).20 By setting targets, raising consciousness and framing, directional and idea-
based leadership coin the overall Horizon 2020 strategy.  
The seventh Framework Programme (FP) (2007-2013)21 of the EC dedicated 
€2,350 million to the energy sector focusing on RES, cleaning other sources of energy, 
                                                          
20 The EU and its MS are not on track for achieving their goal, as the average amounts roughly to 2% 
of their GDP (Eurostat, 2014). 
21 Projects are still running under the Horizon 2020, the eighth FP (DG R&I, 2015a; DG R&I, 2016b). 
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energy efficiency and smart networks (DG R&I, 2016b). According to CORDIS22 
(2016), there are 66 projects specialized on solar energy accounting for more than €280 
million of funding under the seventh FP. The Horizon 2020 and the Strategic Energy 
Technology (SET) Plan shape the eighth framework period for energy research 
funding by the EC, dedicating €5,931 million to non-nuclear energy research for the 
period 2014 to 2020 (EC, 2015e). Despite emphasizing the importance of SPV 
technology and its advance (EC, 2015f; DG R&I, 2015b; DG R&I, 2016a; DG R&I, 
2016b), the Horizon 2020 accounts for 35 solar projects amounting only to roughly 
€94 million (CORDIS, 2016).23 By providing funding, thus, incentives for R&D and 
emphasizing the importance of solar energy, structural and intellectual leadership are 
the employed key modes. 
It shall be mentioned that some funded R&D projects are not about technological 
advance in terms of research in the first place, but focus on knowledge transfer and 
collaboration, for instance STAGE-STE and CHEETAH (CORDIS, 2016). In addition, 
the EU provides financial support for research institutes and facilities such as the 
Cyprus Institute, which cooperates with the Joint Research Centre of the EU and 
focuses on solar energy (Cyprus Institute, 2016). These efforts aim at idea-based 
leadership employing means of structural leadership. 
 By overall goals and framing, the EU utilizes intellectual paired with 
directional leadership. The FPs offer additionally substantial funding for R&D of solar 
technology, may it be thermal, concentrated, PV or storage options. Consequently, the 
emphasis is on manifestations of structural leadership. On national, regional and local 
level, difficulties to find data manifest. However, large projects seek financial aid 
directly from the Union. It has to be pointed out that the leverage effect increases EC 
funding by including MS and economic actors as investors. Since it was not feasible 
to detangle the data, it was more appropriate to state only the amount of the EC 
subsidies.  
6.2.2. USA 
Due to the privatized nature of the U.S. market, one might suspect that there is no 
considerable funding by the government. However, this holds not true as the DOE’S 
                                                          
22 CORDIS, Community Research and Development Information Service, is the EC’s provided platform 
for listing projects under the seventh FP. 
23 The funding period is still open for applications and will continue for four more years (DG R&I, 
2016a). 
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OEERE initiated the SunShot Initiative, which accounts for roughly $200 million in 
R&D investments in solar technologies (OEERE, 2016b). Aiming at reclaiming 
American technological and market leadership, improving energy independence and, 
thus, energy security, strengthening competitiveness, SunShot supports the fight 
against climate change attempting to raise the availability of clean, low-cost and 
reliable solar energy (OEERE, 2016b). Thereby, the initiative represents modes of 
idea-based leadership by raising consciousness and structural leadership by providing 
funding for the research. 
The polity structure of the USA again fosters support on a state level. As a 
paragon, solar frontrunner state California has established two major programs to 
advance solar energy research: the Public Interest Energy Research (PIER) Program 
that provides $62.5 million for electricity R&D and demonstration efforts until 2015 
and the California Solar Initiative Research and Development program that accounts 
for $50 million or roughly $9 million per year (California Public Utilities Commission, 
2016). Incorporating the vision of a solar state and providing funding, the projects 
represent likewise idea-based and structural leadership. Other states seem considerably 
more reluctant to provide substantial funding for solar R&D efforts and the initiatives 
of California remain unmatched.  
Concluding, the USA has not considerably engaged in R&D in terms of solar 
energy. The few projects are based on idea-based leadership employing structural 
leadership measures. Policy strategies depend individual governmental leaders of 
single states and the federal government, since their approach is decisive for the 
introduction, continuation or abolishment of programs. Today, supporting policies are 
rare and, consequently, leadership measures remain weak. 
6.2.3. China 
Among the measures for enhanced action on climate change, China states in its INDC 
its will “to strengthen research and development (R&D) and commercialization 
demonstration for low-carbon technologies, such as … renewable energy” (China, 
2015, p.7). At the same time, China wants to increase financial support, innovate the 
application of funds and explore new investment and financing mechanisms for low-
carbon development, such as public-private partnerships (China, 2015). This is 
supposed to go hand in hand with the implementation of preferential taxation policies 
for promoting the development of new energy and improvements of pricing, grid 
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access and procurement mechanisms for solar, wind and hydro power (China, 2015). 
Despite this statement, the National Program on Climate Action (2014) remains vague, 
only pointing out the importance of the development of low carbon technologies, 
among others, it states the need to promote R&D efforts in solar energy technology 
(China, 2014). Thus, it can only be seen as weak manifestation of idea-based 
leadership aiming at raising consciousness. 
In article 12 of the Renewable Energy Law, the Ministry of Commerce of China 
(MOFCOM) emphasizes the priority of technological advance in the field: 
“Article 12 In the development of science and technology and high-tech industrial 
development, the state shall give priority to the scientific and technological research 
in, and the industrialization of, the development and utilization of regenerable 
resources, incorporate the said research and development and utilization into the 
national scientific and technological development planning and high-tech industrial 
development planning, arrange for funds to support the scientific and technological 
research in, and application, demonstration and industrialization of, the development 
and utilization of regenerable energies, promote the progress of the technology 
relating to the development and utilization of regenerable energies, decrease the 
production cost of the products of renewable energies, and enhance the product 
quality” (MOFCOM, 2013). 
Again, the law remains unclear of the exact measures, but emphasizes the importance, 
and, therefore, represents idea-based leadership. Further documents on the actual 
measures are not available for the international public, thus cannot be assessed in terms 
of leadership. Possibly, they would give insight in measures of structural leadership 
resulting from the law.  
In terms of provincial R&D support, there are only overviews available only 
including superficial information on provincial policies telling of demonstration 
projects provided with grants under the Golden Sun framework and supported by 
provincial funding (e.g. Chu, 2015). Regarding technology, the laws are said to be 
insufficient rather lacking any ambition that would represent leadership modes (Yan, 
2011). In addition, proper standardization and governmental control have not been 
enforced in an appropriate way (Yan, 2011). 
Overall, China seems to abandon leadership measures in the technology sector. 
While technology is not advancing substantially, the market is harmed by weak 
regulations and enforcement. Furthermore, the specifics on the funding of solar R&D 
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projects cannot be properly identified and is even lacking to be sufficient (Yan, 2011). 
Concluding, China’s structural leadership measures are either lagging behind or 
hidden behind a language, cultural or perhaps even political barrier.  
6.3. Institutionalization 
Even if there is political action, the efforts will not make a difference without an 
effective governance framework providing monitoring, supervision and control. The 
polities considerably vary in the three cases and, therefore, special attention has to be 
paid to their structure.  
6.3.1. EU 
Within the European Union, the fight against climate change became intensified and 
more institutionalized by the establishment of the DG Climate Action in 2010 (DG 
Climate, 2016a). Formerly being part of the DGs for Environment, External Relations, 
and Enterprise and Industry, it gained its independence to address more effectively 
climate change acknowledging the importance of the challenge by gathering expertise 
on the matter and strengthening its position, for instance in negotiations (EC, 2010a). 
Co-operation of DGs is common and so the DG Climate Action is teaming up with 
DG Energy when it comes to policies addressing renewable energies. The 
establishment of a separate DG can be interpreted as a manifestation of intellectual 
and directional leadership, because it shapes the framing of climate action 
innovatively. 
On national level, there was no establishment of ministries solely for climate 
matters. Most commonly, ministries dealing with environmental issues are in charge, 
rarely others such as ministries for energy. However, in terms of solar energy, 
ministries for energy are the responsible institutions, sometimes connected to 
ministries of economic affairs. Over the last decades, MS started, in particular due to 
article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union24 and the Cardiff process, to employ a 
more cooperative and inclusive approach considering environmental perspectives in 
other policy areas in order to foster positive-sum solutions (Hertin & Berkhout, 2016). 
This inclusive approach can be considered as innovative as well and, thus, represents 
directional leadership.  
                                                          
24 TEU Art. 6(1) provides legal value to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CoFR), in which 
environmental policy integration is enshrined (CoFR Art.37) (EU, 2000). 
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In addition to the official governmental institutions, representative associations, 
eNGOs and private actors as well as the civil society including individual citizens may 
seek to engage with the EU’s actions by EC’s public consultations (EC, 2016; TEU 
Art.10(3), Art.11). Furthermore, it is provisioned that any individual citizen is entitled 
to raise their voice concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the 
Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies (e.g. TFEU Art.24, Art. 227, Art. 228). 
Industry associations and eNGOs are the first to raise concerns when policies are 
identified either to lack proper implementation or to be badly administered. 
Empowering non-state actors in terms of drafting and supervision, and thereby raising 
awareness and creating collaborations can be characterized as directional and 
intellectual leadership measures, as it is still a frontrunner approach. In particular, the 
engagement in the dialogue with non-state actors could be interpreted as manifestation 
of instrumental leadership, since it can result in a negotiating process weighing 
interests and perspectives. 
The EU employs a distinct approach that can be seen as innovative due to its 
organizational structure. Involvement of stakeholders throughout the process and 
especially beforehand is characteristic for EU action due to EU’s better regulation 
approach (EC, 2016). This considerable inclusion of third parties in the legislative 
process is a frontrunner practice that the EU has strengthened over the last years (EC, 
2016). Consequently, directional, idea-based and instrumental leadership shape the 
Union’s institutionalization. 
6.3.2. USA 
The USA still employs a more separated organizational structure, resembling the EU’s 
before singling out the DG Climate Action. Up to now, the Department of State (DOS), 
which is in charge of international relations, has been involved with partnerships and 
negotiations on climate change on the international stage; the Bureau of Oceans, 
International Environment and Scientific Affairs (OES) is responsible for climate 
change action in this regard (DOS, 2016). Furthermore, the independent federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) advises the government, supervises the 
execution of environmental policies and enforces them (EPA, 2016). The EPA can 
even be seen as a department of environment, because it is given authority by 
legislative acts of Congress and its head is considered cabinet-rank (EPA, 2016). 
However, domestically, the DOE’s OEERE addresses renewable energies such as 
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solar. This complex framework of institutions is neither innovative nor emphasizes it 
the framing of solar energy development. Consequently, manifestations of the modes 
of leadership cannot be identified. 
The USA are furthermore known to be a center of lobbyism, and associations 
such as Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) try to lobby for policies promoting 
solar energy on federal and state level, because the multilevel governance system 
opens different arenas for approaching policymakers (SEIA, 2016; Torfing et al., 
2012). eNGOs have been part of the political culture since the rise of environmentalism 
during the late 1960s, 1970s and 80s, although they have lost their momentum (Hajer, 
1997; Mol, 2001). Although involving stakeholders in the process, the approach does 
not represent any mode of leadership.  
The U.S. polity remains diffuse that can be characterized as a complex but loose 
network of institutions that is only utilized for specific efforts but not aligned in their 
overall vision towards a solar energy development. Neither is framing strongly 
considered nor does the system approach the issue in an innovative way. Coercion or 
incentives are also not utilized. Rather an absence than a manifestation of leadership 
modes characterizes the institutionalization in the USA.  
6.3.3. China 
The distinct governance structure of China results in a complex system of councils and 
ministries. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which answers to the State 
Council (government), was in charge of the Renewable Energy Law. The Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Science & 
Technology as well as the Foreign Investment Administration and the National Energy 
Administration of the National Development and Reform Commission are also of 
relevance, as they for instance introduced the BIPV and Golden Sun programs.25 In 
addition, provincial, regional and local governments are important, since they are in 
charge of supervision. This diffuse multitude and complex net of institutional bodies 
leads to a high risk of dysfunctional, inefficient and fraudulent policies and practices, 
as control of subordinated levels cannot be regarded as granted (Ying, 2011). In this 
system of democratic centralism, power is partly excessively centralized leading to 
arbitrary action of individuals, while other institutions do not comply with superior 
                                                          
25 See Chapter 6.1.3. 
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authorities, enforce law laxly or even undermine countermeasures on the other hand 
(C. Wang, 2013). Jonathan Schwartz’s (2004) study on eNGOs in China confirms that 
local governments focus on short-term economic growth that result almost inevitably 
in declining incentives for environmental protection. An example for lax enforcement 
offers Ying (2011) revealing that provinces went beyond the caps for subsidies, and 
control of companies in terms of standards, material and production cost are 
considerably questionable, even in regard of national subsidy policies like the Golden 
Sun program. Thus, the governmental institutional framework does not represent any 
of the modes of leadership and rather represents the opposite, their absence. 
Despite this diffuse complexity, centralism is notably inherent in China leading 
to a weak position of non-state actors in the framework of Chinese polity (Denyer, 
2015; Gao, 2013). They have to face state countermeasures, if they do not conform to 
the governmental view (Denyer, 2015; Gao, 2013). In particular, eNGOs have not 
come to rise in China so far, being constraint and only allowed by the state to form to 
pursue state goals (Schwartz, 2004; Gao, 2013). Besides the issue of bureaucratic 
registration, eNGOs have to face difficulties in proper litigation against enterprises 
with lax environmental procedures (Gao, 2013). Thus, they remain “merely capable of 
voicing complaints through social and news media” (Gao, 2013, para.11). 
Acknowledging the trust in eNGOs by the civil society, China utilizes them 
particularly for attracting international funding for environmental protection and 
educating the public (Schwartz, 2004). This could be understood as structural 
leadership, as China exerts coercion on eNGOs. 
Overall, the institutional structure of China does not represent any mode of 
leadership in a strong way. In spite of the utilization of eNGOs, structural leadership 
that would be incorporated in a strong supervision and control system is not in place. 
The exclusion of non-state actors also constitutes rather the opposite of directional 
leadership, as it lacks an innovative approach.  
6.4. International Agreements 
As previous research has demonstrated, there is need of analyzing and acknowledging 
international efforts of the cases in the matter of climate action. In fact, international 
conferences and bi- and multilateral agreements can affect domestic developments 
including solar energy, since states commit to action and create opportunities for 
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economic actors. In spite of increasing their participation and initial action in climate 
change agreements, the cases vary in their positioning.  
6.4.1. EU 
In 2005, the EC published a communication on how to tackle climate change outlining 
key elements of the EU’s strategy, and, particularly, emphasizing co-operation with 
third countries (EC, 2005). Arrangements have been set up with a number of OECD 
countries such as USA, Canada, Japan and Australia, but also with the BRICS, South 
Korea and the Ukraine (DG Climate, 2016b). Furthermore, there was support for 
interactions with regional groupings on environmental and climate change issues such 
as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries and the Organisation of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (DG Climate, 2016b). The DG Climate 
Action highlights in particular the bilateral co-operation with China, India and South 
Africa (DG Climate, 2016b). In joint declarations, collaboration in fields such as 
renewable energies including solar are anchored (e.g. EU & China, 2005). The same 
holds true for the EU-India co-operation, in which both sides commit to facilitate 
transfer, deployment and dissemination of sustainable and efficient energy systems 
and promoting renewables (EU & India, 2006). Despite the lack of exact information, 
this engagement in this multitude of agreements can be considered as directional and 
idea-based leadership, since this engagement is leading by example, sharing 
knowledge, furthering specific framings and promoting solutions. In some cases, the 
EU may have employed instrumental or structural leadership to influence behavior or 
pass deals. However, the material could not confirm this suggestion.  
Furthermore, the EU fought valiantly for saving the Kyoto Protocol in the late 
1990s and this is conceived as a major win for its environmental leadership. Bringing 
Russia back to the table by the creation of incentives, structural leadership 
characterized the EU’s action. Since then, despite commitment and the attempt, the 
EU struggled with implementing measures and fulfilling the KP obligations (Parker & 
Karlsson, 2010). However, ever since, the EU’s track record can show participation in 
all major conferences with the attempt to take the lead shaping the framing of the issue 
(Karlsson et al. 2011; Karlsson et al. 2012). Thereby, the EU employed measures of 
directional and idea-based leadership.  
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Regarding initiatives, the EU and its MS are at the forefront to initiate solar 
energy cooperation. In the wake of the COP 21, India and France founded the 
International Solar Alliance bringing together 121 countries and aiming at a total 
amount of $1000 billion in funding, €300 million provided by France alone (Ministry 
of New and Renewable Energy India, 2016). This capital shall be used for the “massive 
deployment of affordable solar energy and to pave the way for future solar generation, 
storage and good technologies” (Ministry of New and Renewable Energy India, 2016). 
Another agreement was set up between Germany and India to support the building of 
solar energy plants with cheap loans that will amount to €1.5 billion is one paragon 
example for the bilateral solar agreements established by EU’s MS (Tagesschau, 
2015). This can also be seen as support and transfer activity; however, as the countries 
established a wide-ranging co-operation involving several areas, it is closer to an 
international agreement. Structural and idea-based leadership are at the core of these 
examples, raising consciousness by framing, shaping preferences with benefits and 
influencing behavior. However, as negotiations are central, instrumental leadership is 
necessary in order to finalize and conclude agreements. 
The efforts of the EU to strengthen its international position seeking 
participation, initiative and co-operation resulting in recognition can be interpreted as 
intellectual and directional leadership measures, because it led to ambitious targets 
combined with a multilateral approach shaping the domestic solar energy development 
by leading by example, emphasizing the importance and, thus, framing the issue. 
Additionally, it created incentives for other actors and the own industry leading to 
global collaboration, partnerships and support. So manifestations of structural 
leadership were utilized as well, although it cannot be stated to what extent. 
6.4.2. USA 
As scholars confirm, under the Obama administration, the USA increased their 
international efforts and participation in multilateral agreements (Bang & Schreurs, 
2010). This became palpable at the COP 15 in Copenhagen, when the USA stepped 
forward to save an agreement and finalize a resolution together with China and the 
other BASIC countries (Karlsson et al., 2012). This can be especially considered as an 
effort characterized by instrumental, directional and intellectual leadership, since 
negotiations were involved and together the actors could pass the agreement. Thereby, 
they demonstrated will and established their framing.  
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In addition, the USA has built up several bilateral climate and energy 
partnerships so far, in particular with India, China, Canada and Mexico for fighting 
climate change. In co-operation with Mexico, the Bilateral Framework on Clean 
Energy and Climate Change was established in 2009 to promote clean energy and 
establish a mechanism for political and technical co-operation and information 
exchange (DOS, 2016; OPS26, 2009). A joint statement in 2015 laid out the efforts 
including setting up a bilateral clean energy and climate policy task force to deepen 
the collaboration in specific areas, among others clean electricity, grid modernization 
and global and regional climate modeling (DOS, 2016). In the wake of the COP 21 in 
Paris, the USA and Canada cooperated and produced a joint statement on climate and 
energy leadership released by the U.S. Office of the Press Secretary (OPS) to secure 
joint efforts to achieve the INDCs and R&D efforts (OPS, 2016). In terms of clean 
energy, the collaborating sides pledged to facilitate grid access for energy from RES 
and to support technology innovation (OPS, 2016). In addition, the USA teamed up 
with China releasing a clean energy announcement in 2009, introducing several 
measures for enhancing progress of clean technologies, amongst them the U.S. China 
Renewable Energy Partnership to support energy deployment from RES and facilitate 
state-to-state and region-to-region partnerships to share experience and best practices 
(OPS, 2009). Also in 2009, the USA engaged with India to establish a partnership on 
clean energy, energy security and climate change (DOS, 2016). The Joint Clean 
Energy Research and Development Center, which got $100 million in public and 
private funding over 5 years, worked on the advance of RES technologies including 
solar (DOS, 2016). As forms of framing, raising consciousness, demonstrating will 
and leading by example are central to these agreements and declarations, idea-based 
and directional leadership characterize them. Furthermore, the engagement with India 
resulted in structural leadership providing benefits and influencing behavior. 
Although none of the measures can be seen as efforts solely aiming at solar 
energy development, they still connected to solar development. By attempting to foster 
collaboration with other countries including the field of RES, the USA established its 
framing, shaped preferences, influenced behavior and demonstrated will. Thus, the 
measures of the USA can be considered as intellectual, structural and directional. As 
                                                          
26 U.S. Office of the Press Secretary. 
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agreements are always based on negotiations, instrumental leadership is also 
inherently involved.  
6.4.3. China 
In China’s NPCA (2014), the significance of international co-operation is emphasized. 
The promotion of a fair and reasonable international climate regime that adheres to the 
principles of the UNFCCC and the common but differentiated responsibilities 
considering the respective capabilities are highlighted as well as safeguarding the 
interests of developing countries (China, 2014). China states its responsibility as a big 
country but emphasizes its role as developing country especially in need of support in 
terms of knowledge transfer and capacity building (China, 2014). Thereby, China 
contributes to the framing of the issue in a specific way, thus, employs intellectual 
leadership. 
On the global stage, China has participated in climate change negotiations from 
the first hour signing the Kyoto Protocol one month after the EU in 1998 resulting in 
its entry into force in February 2005, together with all other countries that had ratified 
it by then (UNFCCC, 2014). However, its commitments and even stalling actions 
during the COP 21 have been criticized by other delegates in terms of less ambitious 
goals and commitments (Clark, 2015), which can be interpreted as structural power 
but not in terms of leadership in regard of solar energy development. Nonetheless, 
China accounts also for significant action in saving the agreement at the COP 15 in 
Copenhagen in co-operation with the USA and the other BASIC countries, as pointed 
out in Chapter 6.4.2. (Karlsson et al., 2012). Likewise, this can be especially 
considered as an effort characterized by instrumental, directional and intellectual 
leadership, since negotiations were involved and, together, the actors could pass the 
agreement. Thereby, they demonstrated will and established their framing. 
Within the South-South co-operation in Asia, China has taken considerably more 
action implementing seven trilateral co-operations with the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and other developing countries (UNDP, 2015). 
China identifies potential for mutual benefits in promoting its low-carbon and 
adaptation technologies and products (China, 2014). Although the co-operations are 
not focusing specifically on solar energy, several of them foster renewable energy 
technology exchange (UNDP, 2015). China employs measures of directional and idea-
based leadership in the South-South co-operation, demonstrating its will and 
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anticipating its framing. Possibly, structural and instrumental leadership were involved 
as well in forging the collaboration, but there were no documents available to confirm 
this.  
The Information Office of the State Council of China (2012) stated in a white 
paper its energy policy highlighting bilateral dialogue and cooperative mechanisms in 
the field of energy with a vast set of countries, unfortunately, not stating the specific 
nature. Again, China’s efforts remain hidden behind a barrier inaccessibility. 
 Concluding, China positions itself as a developing country with all connected 
needs. Despite stating its self-recognized responsibility as a big country, China’s 
efforts in regard of solar energy leadership are less ambitious and more focused on 
security of energy supply for its economy and getting support rather than committing 
to it. Hence, China attempts to employ intellectual leadership by framing itself in the 
context. Only rarely, China steps forward to engage in the agreements employing other 
measures of the leadership modes. At least, that is what the accessible material shows. 
6.5. Support for Less-Developed Countries 
In all three cases, the actors employ distinct strategies to address support for less-
developed countries, thereby fostering knowledge transfer, R&D, production or 
installations of solar power.  
6.5.1. EU 
The EC and EU are the largest aid donator in the world (OECD, 2016). This holds true 
for the field of solar energy as well. Initiated by the DG Climate Action, Solar Energy 
for All and the Africa-EU Energy Partnership are main co-operations under which a 
vast number of projects, for instance the Renewable  Energy  and  Adapting  to Climate 
Technologies Window in Africa (REACT), have emerged (DG Climate, 2016b; DG 
Climate, 2014). The Africa-EU Energy Partnership accounts for €95 million in grants 
for energy projects aiming to reduce energy poverty throughout the continent (DG 
Climate, 2016b). For rural communities in Africa and the Caribbean, the EU 
established funding amounting to €125 million in 2013 (DG Climate, 2016b). Another 
public-private partnership fund for supporting renewable energies in emerging markets 
is the Global Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF), which was 
initiated by the EC in 2006 financed also by Norway and Germany, accounting for 
€222 million in 2015 (GEEREF, 2016). Additionally, the DG International 
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Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) has sparked EuropeAid programs 
throughout the world, which reach from South and Latin America, to Morocco and 
Sub-Saharan Africa to India and Pacific island states (DG DEVCO, 2016). All these 
projects, contributing partly to the expansion of solar energy also by providing 
business opportunities, are instances of leading by example as well as promoting the 
framing and ideas of the EU by financial support. Hence, they can be understood as 
measures of directional, intellectual and structural leadership. 
In addition to funding solar energy projects, the EU supports knowledge transfer 
projects financially. Among those, Climate Change Technology Transfer Centres in 
Europe and Latin America (CELA) under the umbrella framework of ALFA program, 
which received funds amounting to €75 million (CELA, 2016; DG DEVCO, 2016). 
CELA fosters knowledge distribution and exchange as well as provides capacity-
building measures on a global level, including RES (CELA, 2016). Another 
illustration is the Vocational Training Centre for Renewable Energies and Industrial 
Maintenance in Cape Verde supported by Luxembourg (DG Climate, 2014). Although 
structural leadership is in place by capital flows, knowledge sharing, promotion of 
ideas and leading by example, thus, directional and idea-based leadership are at the 
core of the project. 
All these illustrations of support for less-developed countries can account for 
financial support and/or capacity building efforts including knowledge transfer. 
Covering large parts of the world, EU’s support emphasizes the focus on idea-based 
and directional leadership supported by structural leadership measures, since it 
engages in framing and shaping the discourse, leading by example and creating 
incentives for political and economic actors. 
6.5.2. USA 
The U.S. American institution for international development aid is to U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), whose budget amounts to not even 1% of the 
federal budget (USAID, 2016). The large energy project today is Power Africa, which 
is meant to connect sub-Saharan households to electricity with the most significant 
contribution being the installation of an industrial-size SEP in Rwanda (USAID, 
2016). Launched in 2013, the initiative is a transaction-based support framework for 
energy projects across Africa and accounts for $7 billion in financial support from the 
U.S. government alone creating leverage effects and raising private capital (USAID, 
 
41 
 
2016). The creation of incentives for economic actors to engage in development efforts 
can be seen as structural leadership measures. The project itself can be understood as 
sharing ideas, framing and leading by example and, thus, as efforts of intellectual and 
directional leadership. 
In addition to the USAID, the DOS, responsible for international co-operation, 
set up the U.S.-Indonesia Partnership on Climate Change and Clean Energy in the 
wake of the Copenhagen Accord in 2009. Focusing more on support than co-operation, 
the partnership offers a total of $136 million in U.S. funding for climate protection 
measures and capacity building (DOS, 2016). Furthermore, USAID’S Indonesia Clean 
Energy Development Program enhances efforts on addressing regulatory barriers, 
capacity constraints and supporting development of RES, while fostering private 
enterprises to cooperate in trade and development regarding RES (USAID, 2016; DOS 
2016). Thus, again, the partnership encompasses measures of directional and 
intellectual leadership strengthened by structural leadership contributions. 
Overall, despite focusing only on specific parts of the world, the USA employs 
a strategy utilizing measures of directional, intellectual and structural leadership in 
regard of support for less-developed countries. Thereby, it heavily relies on leverage 
effects and incentives for enterprises, which is in particular of significance for the solar 
industry sector as it can profit from it. Consequently, the USA employs structural 
leadership measures to further not only development of less-developed countries but 
also its own domestic industry sectors despite not utilizing an intellectual leadership 
approach. 
6.5.3. China 
In its INDC, China states its status as developing country and a set of actions developed 
and developing countries should do in order to foster climate action. Therein,  
“[d]eveloped countries shall provide support for developing countries to formulate and 
implement national adaptation plans…. developed countries … shall provide new, 
additional, adequate, predictable and sustained financial support to developing 
countries.... developed countries shall transfer technologies and provide support for 
the research, development and application of technologies to developing countries 
based on their technology needs…. developed countries … shall provide support to 
developing countries in capacity building in all areas” (China, 2015, p.18-19). 
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 By identifying itself as a developing country, China does not engage with the 
responsibility of sharing knowledge and technology as well as providing financial 
support. Instead, China utilizes agreements and co-operation to foster its own 
development by offering opportunities for its domestic industry. This could be 
understood as structural leadership in regard of the domestic solar industry. Otherwise, 
China refrains from employing measures that would represent leadership modes. 
6.6. Customs 
For customs, it is relevant where products are produced and to which countries they 
are exported. In the matter of SPV parts, cells and modules, China, Malaysia and 
Taiwan are the most prominent countries of origin, as they can provide SPV products 
to a considerably low price (pv magazine, 2016). Therefore, the imposition and 
maintenance of anti-dumping (AD) tariffs and countervailing duties (CVD) protects 
domestic industry sectors from countries with competitive advantage. 
6.6.1. EU 
In 2013, the EC introduced a tariff on solar glass from China of 17.1% to 42.1% 
dependent on the co-operation with the investigation as an anti-dumping measure 
(Clover, 2013). For avoid dumping prices, a minimum import price was set for SPV 
products from China. The EU decided not to seize the tariffs, but impose them even 
retrospectively on imports from Malaysia and Taiwan as well, as Chinese producers 
were trying to circumvent the imposed tariffs via third countries (Gifford, 2016).27 For 
domestic sector development, the protectionist measures such as the employed tariffs 
impose costs on and decrease imports. Thereby, they attempt to affect the domestic 
industry positively. Hence, the measures can be understood as manifestation of 
structural leadership in regard of the domestic solar industry development, however 
not as structural leadership in terms of supporting the expansion of solar energy. The 
employment of protectionism results in the absence of a leveled market and free 
competition and is a sign for the absence of leading by example, thus, directional 
leadership preventing joint solutions, as idea-based leadership would aim for. 
 
 
                                                          
27 Imports from Malaysia and Taiwan were exempted from the ruling before (Gifford, 2016). 
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6.6.2. USA 
Over the last years, imports of PV cells and modules have seen a change in tariffs in 
the USA (Roselund, 2014a; Roselund, 2014b; Gifford, 2015). U.S. rulings imposed 
and raised AD tariffs and CVD of 21.73%28 and up to 238.95%29 on in particular but 
not only Chinese and Taiwanese SPV products to protect its own manufacturing 
(Gifford, 2015). AD tariffs and CVD distinguish not only products by the country of 
origin, but also from specific manufacturing enterprises, for instance due to non-
cooperation with the Department of Commerce (Roselund, 2014a; Gifford, 2015).  
The USA approaches customs in a similar way as the EU. The employment of 
protectionism results in the absence of a leveled market and free competition and is a 
sign for the absence of leading by example, thus, directional leadership, preventing 
joint solutions, as idea-based leadership would aim for. For domestic sector 
development, the protectionist measures such as the employed tariffs impose costs on 
and decrease imports aiming at supporting the domestic industry. Therefore, the 
measures can be understood as structural leadership in regard of the domestic solar 
industry development, however not as structural leadership in terms of supporting the 
expansion of solar energy.  
6.6.3. China 
So far, China has introduced low tariffs on solar products for most favored nations 
including all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). For SPVs and crucial 
parts, the duties remain at 20%, while batteries are even exempt from any duty 
(General Administration of Customs, 2016). For non-favored nations, the duties 
amount up to 100% of the value for SPVs and parts, and 30% for batteries (General 
Administration of Customs, 2016). The duties inhibit the import of solar products and 
can shape the domestic market, especially as the production costs in China are lower 
than in most other countries (pv magazine, 2016; Reuters, 2015a). Thus, China 
supports its own solar industry sector and refrains from opening the market completely 
for foreign products to raise global competition. Although the tariffs are considerably 
lower, China employs a similar approach as the USA and EU, supporting its domestic 
industry with structural power. This structural leadership in regard of its own solar 
industry is nevertheless limited as there are no tariffs on batteries used for solar 
                                                          
28 AD and CVD for Yingli Green Energy Holding Company Limited. 
29 AD and CVD for not listed companies. 
 
44 
 
products. In this case, China employs a strategy that could be understood as directional 
leadership by leading by example.  
7. Discussion of the Findings 
The objective of this exploratory study was to develop a theorization of how political 
leadership could have an impact on domestic solar energy development by illustrations 
of the employed policy strategies in the six operative dimensions of solar energy 
development. It could be identified that the cases constitute three distinct approaches 
of solar energy development representing a specific set of leadership modes. As there 
is a considerable variation in the actual domestic solar development, as data of the IEA 
(2016) shows, it can be suggested that the employed policy strategies may contribute 
to the domestic solar development. Now, it is possible to elaborate on which ideal-
typical leadership modes the policy strategies of the cases employed and how they 
might reflect on the domestic development. The three distinct policy strategies with 
their manifestations of specific sets of leadership modes lead to the discovery of three 
empirical ideal types of solar energy leadership: the visionary, the pretender and the 
hidden leader. 
7.1. The Visionary 
The visionary creates and shapes ideas, finds solutions and experiments with them, 
implements both and spreads them. The visionary not only demonstrates will, but 
attempts to lead the development by example utilizing resources to shape preferences 
and behavior. Thus, manifestations of directional and idea-based leadership are the 
two core modes of leadership shaping the policy strategy. The utilization of resources 
represents structural leadership measures to strengthen the efforts in regard of 
directional and intellectual leadership. Thereby, advanced institutionalization and 
policies, as well as global ideological and financial support are characteristics of the 
visionary’s approach. Self-presentation is an important factor, but recognition has to 
be achieved to unfold its power. The visionary might fail its ambition by neglecting 
structural and directional leadership measures. This would result in weakened idea-
based leadership manifestations, as they would not be substantiated by further 
measures. However, it seems possible that a visionary does not employ structural 
power, but only engages in the dialogue shaping the framing and furthers the 
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development by leading by example and experimenting with solutions, thus employs 
only intellectual and directional leadership manifestations.  
In this study, the EU is a visionary of solar energy development. The Union 
attempts to take the lead both domestically and internationally. Whether this truly is 
the case, has to be examined, as there are several issues the EU has to face. At the COP 
15 in Copenhagen, the EU lost its leading momentum with its self-perception as a 
leader is stronger than the recognition by others, its 2030 CEF is vague and does not 
set any fixed targets or paths, and the tariffs on solar products inhibit faster domestic 
progress to go solar. Nevertheless, the EU and its MS experiment with policy solutions 
and try to engage in sharing best practices, knowledge transfer and support internally 
and externally. Institutional monitoring and control structures are strong and even 
complimented by non-state actors such as eNGOs, economic actors and civil society. 
Whether the EU has found the best way to foster development of the solar sector, its 
production industry and new installations, can be questioned, as Pablo-Romero (2013) 
did. Nevertheless, it tries to contribute to the development ideologically, if not 
substantially. 
Visionaries are not save from competition and even internal struggles. Both can 
lead to a decline and development to the second category, a pretender.  
7.2. The Pretender 
The pretender has a strong position on the world stage and is mainly driven by self-
interest and the furthering of its global power. Showing especially structural strength, 
the pretender focuses on single actions, for instance international agreements or 
supporting single projects. However, domestically, the pretender is far from furthering 
development and employs a non-innovative approach, resulting in the status of 
underdevelopment in the respective field. Hence, the pretender follows policy 
strategies only utilizing single measures of structural, directional and/or intellectual 
leadership measures to construct an illusion of being a frontrunner or strong supporter. 
The USA are the example of a pretender in the context of solar energy 
development. There are no universal promotional policies, no long-term R&D funding, 
no strong institutionalization and control. If it was not for the Californian government, 
the USA would not be able to even pretend its ambition to foster solar energy. On the 
international stage, the pretender can emerge, distinguish itself and put its own interest 
first, when the visionary fails, as the USA did at the COP 15 in Copenhagen. 
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For pretenders, there is a chance of engaging with the respective field and, 
thereby, developing into a visionary. On the other hand, one could imagine that a 
pretender disengages completely, but as long as the pretender can uphold the illusion, 
it probably will because it strengthens its position on the global stage. 
7.3. The Hidden Leader 
The hidden or hiding leader has advanced the development in the respective field while 
not being noticed or recognized as a leader in the first place/yet. While domestic 
measures increased and fostered development, the hidden leader has not emerged on 
the global stage to take the lead possibly by even understating its competence, 
influence or possibilities. It might even be the case that a hidden leader utilizes barriers 
such as cultural, language or political for hiding. Consequently, hidden leaders can 
openly pursue their own interest, for instance getting support, and will not be as 
fiercely criticized as the other two types for doing so. Overall, a mix of leadership 
modes characterizes the hidden or hiding leader’s employed policy strategy. Structural 
leadership and idea-based leadership are utilized to foster domestic development, but 
not engaging externally. Directional leadership is rather rarely or poorly employed in 
the overall strategy.  
In terms of solar energy development, China can be identified as hidden or 
hiding leader. It has substantially advanced in the solar sector over the last years, as 
the data of the IEA (2016) shows. Now leading in annually and total installed capacity, 
China has gone beyond the promotional measures of the USA, although it faces issues 
of dysfunctionality in the institutionalization and engages only for own interest 
internationally. During the identification process of the material, this study had to face 
issues of availability and accessibility. Without the support of a translator, it would not 
have been possible to assess the material. Not only was the language barrier tangible, 
but even an either cultural, political or ignorance-based barrier. Consequently, the 
accessibility and availability of documents constituted issues during the research. 
China’s status as a developing country supports the hiding of the progress, and it 
entails that it does not have to commit itself as strongly as the visionary or even the 
pretender.  
The hidden leader has the potential of becoming a visionary by emerging on the 
global stage and stepping forward in the matter. An overall strategy with clear 
ambitions would be as necessary as the strengthening of the domestic framework of 
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policy strategies. However, there are other developments possible: staying a hidden or 
hiding leader, disengaging from the field, becoming a pretender or evolving into 
something new. 
8. Conclusions 
The objective of this exploratory study was to develop a theorization of how political 
leadership could have an impact on domestic solar energy development by illustrations 
of the employed policy strategies in the six dimensions of solar energy development. 
Therefore, it decomposed solar energy leadership in six crucial operative dimensions 
of policy strategies that potentially affect the domestic solar energy development. 
Employing ideal-typical modes of leadership theory as a deductive coding frame, the 
three cases of China, the USA and EU were analyzed, which revealed profound 
differences in the employed strategies. Consequently, three empirical ideal types of 
solar energy leadership were identified: The visionary, the pretender and the hidden 
leader. While the first utilizes in particular manifestations of directional and structural 
leadership to substantiate its idea-based leadership efforts, the second only employs 
single measures of the same leadership modes and relies particularly on structural 
power, whereas the third relies on domestic structural and idea-based leadership effort. 
As there is a considerable variation in the actual domestic solar development, as data 
of the IEA (2016) shows, it can be suggested that the distinct employed policy 
strategies may contribute to the domestic solar development. 
In the end, the question who has been the leader in domestic solar energy 
development should be addressed. From the analysis, it is relatively apparent that the 
USA has not been able to live up to be a leader attempting to push forward its own 
interest pretending to be a leader. Despite its strong advance in installations, China 
hides behind its status as a developing country and lacks strong supervision and control 
mechanisms covering its efforts to not be put in responsibility. According to the 
method of elimination and as the naming of visionary might suggest, the European 
Union would have been the leader in the field. However, its efforts have decreased 
domestically and new installations have slowed down. Solar energy accounts still only 
for less than 1% of the gross final consumption (Eurostat, 2015). Therefore, my 
suggestion is to refrain from identifying a leader in solar energy development, but 
engage with the discourse of how policy strategies can foster the development and 
advance by employing specific modes of leadership. All three cases show considerable 
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elements of policy strategy representing manifestations of leadership modes and can, 
thus, contribute to the discussion. 
8.1. Implications 
Based on previous research, this study did not only consider the EU and the USA but 
also included for the first time China in leadership measures in regard of one aspect of 
climate change mitigation. The findings of the employed approaches and strategies in 
solar development might be found surprising. The suggestion of hidden leaders implies 
that cases should be included that have not been considered in previous research. By 
the inclusion of China, this study attempted to open up space for discourse on practices 
to foster development of RES and in the end climate action, at the hand of solar energy. 
Thereby, measures, solutions and strategies were examined that can be utilized by 
global actors to position themselves on the global stage. 
8.2. Further Research 
This project was limited in scope and scale. In-depth studies of single cases or focusing 
on other cases might confirm or reshape the suggested empirical ideal types. For 
instance, studies could consider Japan being placed third in the total solar capacity 
(IEA PVPS, 2016; Table 1 in the Appendix) or focus on India as uprising solar power. 
Furthermore, as it has been explicitly stated, interrelatedness of the dimensions has not 
been taken into consideration, but a profound analysis of the connections could unearth 
substantial findings. Besides the interrelatedness, the process of policy strategy 
formation could be analyzed as well and how it influences the strategies and the 
development in the end. 
The methodological approach could be applied to the assessment of other fields 
to discover whether the typology could be applied. Instances could be other renewable 
energies such as wind and hydro power. However, the theorization could be put to a 
test in all fields of environmental policy such as waste management, carbon capture 
and reforestation. In the end, it might even be fruitful to go beyond and apply the 
theorization to other political field including social policy, civil rights, digitalization, 
transportation and economics. 
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10. Appendix 
 
Table 1: New PV Installations and Total Installed Capacity in 2015. Data from IEA PVPS, 2016. 
      
Rank Country New Installation  
(in GW) 
Rank Country Total Capacity  
(in GW) 
1 China 15.2  1 China 43.5 
2 Japan 11 2 Germany 39.7 
3 USA 3.5 3 Japan 34.4 
4 UK 3.5 4 USA 25.6 
5 India 2 5 Italy 18.9 
6 Germany 1.5 6 UK 8.8 
7 South Korea 1 7 France 6.6 
8 Australia 0.9 8 Spain 5.4 
9 France 0.9 9 Australia 5.1 
10 Canada 0.6 10 India 5 
 
 
 
  
